TNAG-0478-FCO40-543-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 71

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prepared to leave a very small residual presence in support of our partners in the Arrangements as long as they require this.

number of men required will depend partly on further consultation with our partners; the Minister of State for Defence had preliminary consultations with them in May. The number will not be more than 100 and will probably be much lower.

BRUNEI

5. The Gurkha battalion in Brunei is paid for by the Sultan, but it would be in our interest to withdraw it and end our commitment to Brunei. We should first need to re-negotiate our obligations to Brunei in relation to any external attack and her external affairs. This cannot legally be accomplished in much less than two years from the time the Sultan is given notice.

INDIAN OCEAN

6.

We should withdraw from Gan and Mauritius by 1976. Minimum support for residual Indian Ocean tasks could be provided at Diego Garcia.

OMAN.

7. We should continue to aim at ending our direct assistance to the Sultan's Armed Forces against the rebels in Dhofar as soon as the military situation permits and in a way acceptable to the Iranians, Saudi Arabians and to the Americans. This would save about £600,000 a year. Any renegotiation of the airfield facilities at Masirah will have to take into account our re-broadcasting facilities and US views on the value of the intelligence gathering facilities there.

SHARJAH

8. The British military assistance team will be withdrawn during 1975. This will save about £300,000 a year.

CENTO

9.

We could, at negligible cost, continue our membership of the

/Military

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