TNAG-0478-FCO40-543-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 112

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Governor has not exaggerated the difficulty of getting Hong Kong to agree to the concept of a 100% contribution, or the undesir- able consequences that would flow from it. His advice is given as a British civil servant. The Treasury's rejection of that advice as being no more than an opening bid (in which they have some support from MCD) has no objective basis.

5. Because of this disagreement the Paper has no agreed solutions but a series of questions in para. 16. Ideally these should be replaced by recommendations in the 700 sense, which Sir J Hunt will probably support. The Treasury will be strongly opposed, and agreement is unlikely at this stage.

6.

The paper is also defective in lesser respects:-

(There

i. It obscures the fact that the Governor's proposals include,

within the £38 m figure, keeping the two British infantry battalions at their present reduced level (about 2/3rds 1.c. roughly minimum marming strength). MOD, who have complicated the Sub-Committee's work by using different figures from the Services in Hong Kong, have included the two battalions at full strength in this figure. is some pressure from the Army Department not to accept the Governor's concept on the grounds that not all British battalions are at present below strength and they would probably be at full strength in future if the Critical Level is adopted). This is unfortunate presentationally because it could give Ministers the impression that the Governor is being less cooperative than he might have been by offering to give up only the reinforcement capab- ility. We should try to get this corrected.

ii.

There are one or two drafting errors and omissions.

paras. 3 and 4 of the paper it would be useful if the total

/costs

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