SECRET
and facilities at Masirah would have to be accepted".
We can agree with the first sentence. Subject to negotiation with the Sultan and provided the military sit- uation permits, it should be possible to start the gradual withdrawal of our direct military assistance from Dhofar in 1975, leading to a major reduction in 1976. However, the SAS element (representing about 25% of the total) is likely to be required for several years thereafter. No time scale need be attached to the run down of loan Service Personnel for whom the Sultan pays in full; this will take place naturally when trained Omani replacements become available.
The question of the air field and facilities at Masirah is less simple. The air field is at present required
mainly in connection with our South East Asian and Far East
commitments, and the main RAF element could and should be
reduced discreetly as soon as the proposed reductions in our commitments east of Suez allow.
But there are also RAF intelligence-gathering facilities at Masirah (not declared to the Sultan) on which the Americans may have views, as well as British re-broadcasting facilities which we wish to retain, MOD have also recently said that some alternative minimal staging facilities in the Gulf may be
necessary. Moreover total withdrawal from Masirah would require the termination of our present 99 years lease, which has no escape clause. This could cause difficulty.
A final decision on whether to retain minimal facilities
at Masirah should be left for further detailed examination for
consultation with the Americans.
Malta (paragraph 36)
OPD (74) 23's basic recommendation that we should with- draw from Malta on the expiry of the Military Facilities Agreement in 1979 is clearly right. To attempt to withdraw earlier would
cause trouble both with our NATO allies and with Malta.
The question for decision (and for negotiation with the Maltese) will be the pace and scope of the run-down of our
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