TNAG-0477-FCO40-542-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 56

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However,

designed within the total cost implied by the Critical Level. The Steering Committee will presumably decide at this stage only how these models should be prepared. The bulk of the work

will clearly fall to the Ministry of Defence.

it is we in the FCO who have pointed out that the particular package of cuts proposed by the Chiefs of

Staff to reach the Critical Level may unnecessarily upset our Allies, and it would be appropriate for us to participate fully in the work now required.

You

may wish to propose this.

Ministers also directed that further studies shoula

be made of the extent of the redundancies in Service

personnel, Civil Servants and in industry which woulä be involved by cuts to the Critical Lovel. We believe that the cuts proposed by the Chiefs of Staff fell unnecessarily heavily on uniformed and front line forces. We have been told by the Ministry of Tefence

that our pressure for a further examination of techl--to-

tail ratios may be counter-productive. But there is no

doubt that our Allios will be much more concer.ed by

reductions in British front line forces than by cuts in civilian and support establishments, and whether

the Ministry of Defence like it or not they must be prepared for much more work on this point. It might be best for us to make this point in relation to the

further studies of alternative force mixos at the

Critical Cost Level rather than in the context of

redundancies.

3.

Mr Howard Smith also indicated that it was possible that

Sir John Hunt would raise the question of Belize which was not

considered by Ministers at the meeting. If so you might say that we believe our defence capability in Belize could be removed once a political settlement of the dispute there is

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