need to be justified to ExCo on the basis of professional advice. The Defence Agreement expired in 1976 and it would otherwise be difficult to persuade Hong Kong to increase its contribution
thereafter.
19.
It was pointed out that in the current Defence Review the starting position of MOD officials was that all British forces should be removed, and the Treasury position was that Hong Kong should pay the full cost of whatever garrison was retained. However, Mr Rodgers had agreed with Sir Murray Machehose that Britain did have some special responsibility towards Hong Kong. Difficult negotiations were in prospect. Policy would probably need to be settled at Ministerial level and, meanwhile, Sir Murray was concerned that his views should be reflected (if only in a footnote) in the Defence Review working party's report.
20.
It was observed that UK relations with Peking could be seriously affected if the UK found herself unable to maintain internal security in Hong Kong. Any reinforcement of the garrison (if this suddenly became recessary) would itself be provocative to China. Especially in view of the uncertainties about China's future leadership, it would be foolish and short-sighted to take risks which might complicate Anglo-Chinese relations.
21.
Lord Goronwy-Roberts said that he well understood the Hong Kong position. It was not practicable to rely on external reinforcement in case of emergency. The crucial question, and starting point, was the size of garrison necessary in order to be credible both externally and internally (with all that internal credibility implied for Hong Kong's relations with China).
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.