TNAG-0477-FCO40-542-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 165

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term also seems a political impossibility. Any significant reduction would therefore have to fall somehow on Hong Kong, Cyprus, or Gibraltar or a combination of all three.

4. However, from what you and your Under-Secretaries have said so far our representatives at this stage could properly say only that the political commitments which we are currently proposing seem to us to represent the bare minimum for the foreseeable future. Changes in political circum- stances could in due course change the picture considerably and enable us, for example, to give up the commitments in Gibraltar and Cyprus. It would therefore be infinitely preferable to avoid trying to decide now exactly where cuts should fall as far ahead as 1983/84, even if we had to accept in principle that some reduction in expenditure by that time would have to be achieved.

S

5.

The next best way of dealing with the problem would be for us to be given time say 6 months in which to work out with the MOD and the intelligence organisations variations on the MOD's proposed military solutions, without altering the political commitments. I cannot comment on the intelligence aspects, but the kind of variations which might in the last resort be acceptable to the MOD (even though they say at present that their present proposals represent the minimum forces which make military sense) are:-

i)

give up the idea of continuing to base Hercules and Vulcans at Akrotiri, and give up or reduce the facilities for operating the airfield. provide savings of up to £12m plus.

This would

ii)

Reduce the number of troops in Hong Kong still further, eg by a further one or two major units (saving perhaps £2-£4m).

iii) Hand over to the Hong Kong police the naval protection rôle envisaged for the five RN patrol craft (saving of £1.1m).

iv) Reduce the RAF presence in Hong Kong (saving of ? £lm).

v) Seek some reduction in the garrison in Gibraltar

vi)

6.

(saving of ? £2m).

Reduce the Masirah arrangements even further in the 1980s than the MOD envisage (saving ? £0.75m).

Superficially it might seem theoretically possible as last resort, if we were pressed to decide now to give up some commitment/commitments, to consider withdrawing from Cyprus. This would provide all the savings (at least on the

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/Defence Vote

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