that the matter was under active consideration
might also become appropriate before long. (ii) Five Power Defence Arrangements It is
arguable that Ministers have broadly
(ths
decided already that our presence in Singapore should be reduced to the absolute minimum, that our partners in the Five Power Defence Arrange- ments are expecting severe cuts in our forces, and that a further round of consultations with them (after discussion with the Americans) could therefore go ahead more or less at once. However, the Americans will see arrangements in Singapore as being relevant to our arrange- ments for the Indian Ocean as a whole, and they will find it difficult to talk usefully about
to talk useful them in isolation. This is one of the most
important of the non NATO areas for the American and they may hold particularly strong views abou our intentions there which could prolong consult tions with them. We have already had indications, for example, that they hope we will not give up
our maritime reconnaissance effort in the Indian Ocean and even that they might be prepare to contribute financially to residual British activity in Singapore. They will want to know, for example, what our intentions are about Gan, Maritius and Masirah, which we cannot say until the delicate question of Diego Garcia has been more clearly resolved on both sides of the
Atlantic.
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CPD
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Spec. fendly)
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(iii) Malta It is arguable that our intentions are m clear enough and fall clearly enough within
our rights under the current Malta Agreement, for us similarly to tell Mintoff fairly soon
of them, especially since the Americans might logically expect us to be ready to say something
/about
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