TNAG-0477-FCO40-542-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 135

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

SEORET

training for jungle warfare,

But for local political reasons it

would be in our interest to end this commitment. It could also be

presentationally useful in the context of the defence review to show that we were bringing some of our non-NATO commitments entirely to an end in the near future. .

28. South Korea If we remain in Hong Kong we could continue to provide from our forces there the contribution of 22 men to the United Nations Honour Guard. Presentationally there would be some minor advantage in ending this commitment, but it is likely that the United' Nations Command will be abolished within the next year or two and we might delay withdrawal until then.

29. Five Power Dofence Arrangements At the minimum we would confirm the consultative commitment and leave only our contribution (five men) to the integrated air defence system.

30. Indian Ocean Foroes could be withdraw from Gan and Mauritius by 1976; minimum support for residual Indian Ocean tasks could be provided by transferring the necessary facilities and manpower to Diego Garoia, if we agree to the American request to expand the faoilities, which would bé for joint use, at their own expense.

31. Oman

We will end our military involvement in the Sultan's war against the rebels as soon as we can do so in a way acceptable to the Iranians, Saudi Arabia and the Americans,

32. Sharjah The British Military Assistance team will be withdraw during 1975.

33. CENTO We could, at negligible cost, continue our membership of the Military Committee and retain the United Kingdom Permalient Military Deputy and the attached officers. The Shah will need careful handling.

34. Cyprus Our position in Cyprus is important to the cohesion of NATO's southern flank, Our withdrawal from either or both of our Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) would be likely to lead to severe tension between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Without the SBAs we could not maintain the intelligence gathering facilities to which both we and the Americans attach high importance. An attempt to concentrate in one SBA would not mitigate the political repercussions and would

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