TNAG-0477-FCO40-542-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 110

Mr Thomson

DEFENCE REVIEW: OMAN

SECRET

5H

هال

:

1. I was horrified to see from para 25 of the P.U.S.'s minute to you of 13 July that at its Meeting on 12 July the Defence

Review Steering Committee decided to amend para 34 of the draft

Report to read "We will end our military involvement in the

Sultan's war against the rebels as soon as we can do so in a way acceptable to the Iranians, Saudi Arabia and the Americans."; and to add the following sentence "The loss of the airfield and facilities at Masirah would have to be accepted". I do not know

what reasons were advanced for this conclusion, but the result

looks like a complete reversal of what we had previously

understood the consensus in the Defence Review Working Party to

be.

2. As

understood it, the consensus was that we should aim

to reduce the direct assistance we provide to the Sultan's

forces in the campaign against the rebels in Dhofar provided the

Military situation continued to improve. This assistance in fact amounts only to the provision of small units of the SAS and Royal Engineers plus (for the defenceof RAF Salalah) RAF Regiment

and Royal Artillery units; the last two however could only be

withdrawn subject to renegotiation of the agreements related to Masirah. We have throughout been given to understand that there

was no question of withdrawing British loan service personnel from the Sultan's Armed Forces (for which the Sulton pays), nor of giving up the airfield and the intelligence and re-broadcasting facilities on Masirah, even though the airfield might not be required for staging (and its maintenance staff could thus be substantially reduced).

* R

Th. Wilfund

1

SECRET

3.