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them for only a limited period of time, would enable us to protect
some major British and Western interests, eg those in Hong Kong and
Cyprus, and to phase out other obligations in the least damaging way
possible. We could continue to undertake as a spin-off from our
NATO expenditure a minimal amount of useful activity outside the
NATO area, eg naval visits and joint exercises. Whatever course is
followed there will be a number of important consequential decisions
about consultation, presentation and phasing. These decisions will
require much more detailed consideration than can be given here.
However, the way in which we deal with the other Governments concerned
can be just as important for our interests as the substantive decisions
about the future level of the forces in support of our commitments.
60.
A compressed summary of the individual commitments and political
implications of the changes embodied in Options A1 and A2 is set out
in Annex A for all the territories concerned.
Several of the commit-
ments and of the forces provided to give effect to them are inter-
related. Moreover, although both A Options deal with non-NATO
obligations, it must be remembered that the Mediterranean is part of
the NATO area and that our NATO allies have a direct interest in what
we decide to do about Cyprus, Malta and Gibraltar. Further, the US
will also have a direct interest in our decisions in these and other
areas, eg. the Far East and the Middle East. Option A2 attempts to
take some account of this complex inter-relationship.
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