TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 227

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partners and our own wider interests in the area. Any hasty withdrawal

military support would be embarrassing and unwelcome to them and

would also be regretted by other friendly governments, eg the

United States and Indonesia. A limited or phased reduction might

not be regarded as disastrous if carefully presented. A complete

withdrawal of our military contributions would be a blow to

confidence in the area but might be offset if we could work out

credible plans for meeting the implied commitment to come to the

assistance of Malaysia or Singapore in appropriate circumstances,

eg by reinforcement from Hong Kong. If we wished to withdraw all

our forces and also to terminate our participation in the Arrangements,

and particularly if we did so without very careful preparation and

consultation, we should not only damage regional stability but also

risk seriously alienating four important Commonwealth partners.

Precipitate action could jeopardise the continuation of the

Arrangements in any form and would very likely damage relations

between Malaysia and Singapore in particular.

Recommendation

12. In order to assess the effects of any changes that might be

proposed for the Governments to whom commitments have been made,

consultation is necessary during the course of the defence review

and not merely when conclusions have been reached. We recommend

that at an early stage in the Review a Minister should visit the

other Five Power capitals to determine their attitude to the options

set out above and the political implications of each.

Consultation

with Brunei at Ministerial level will also be desirable at an

appropriate stage. Meanwhile it will be important to keep the Sultan

of Brunei informed in general terms about our intentions.

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