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UNFICYP have been separated in this paper, since the one is a national and the other a UN commitment, there is an obvious link between decisions about the two. If for example, we were to withdraw from the SBAS, this might inject a new element of instability into the Cyprus situation and we might as a result be called upon even to increase our contribution to UNFICYP rather than running it down. REINFORCEMENT AND GENERAL CAPABILITY
107. It is worth underlining again that much greater savings could almost certainly be made, and in general at a much lower political cost, by the reduction of the general capability of our forces than by the withdrawal of forces from particular places or the termination of particular treaty commitments. The technical decisions on exactly
how such savings could be made are of course for the MOD. But the basic decisions from which any reduction of capability would flow are political, because they are concerned with the issue of what tasks HM forces must be capable of undertaking. This issue is closely connected with basic issues of foreign policy, and as such is of vital concern to the FCO.
CONSULTATION
108. Almost any withdrawal of any British forces from anywhere, and almost any abandonment of commitments, would be unwelcome to the US Administration at a time when Soviet forces are increasing in size and widening the scope of their activities, and when there is pressure in Congress for the reduction of America's defence spending (exceptions
For this are probably Belize, the Falklands, and perhaps Gibraltar). reason, and because of the need to ensure the continued coordination of Western defence efforts, it is of prime importance to consult the Americans at a very high level before final decisions are taken. What we should ask the Americans for is an indication of their priorities, i.e. to which of our commitments and activities do they attach most importance, and which do they think are of lesser value? Clearly, such a consultation should not be confined to our non-NATO commitments. but should be a consultation about our defence activities as a whole. 109. There are a number of other countries whom we should also consult, preferably at a high level, before final decisions are taken, in relation to particular commitments. These are as follows:
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