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101. It may be objected that the distinction between capabilities and commitments is a false one, since all our capabilities exist in
This is a reason- order to meet commitments of one kind or another.
able objection, but the point is that some commitments are much more precise, binding and immediate than others. HM forces do have commit- ments to "show the flag" around the world, and to be able to respond to the unforeseen. But these are not precise commitments resulting from treaties or assurances to foreign governments. Whatever may have been the case in the past, it would surely be wrong, at a time when defence expenditure as a whole is under close scrutiny, to maintain forces specifically for such purposes. It is of course a quite different
matter when we are able to use forces whose raison d'etre is to meet a specific treaty commitment for temporary flag-showing duties, or in order to help deal with an unforeseen emergency such as a natural
disaster.
102. There is also a general requirement to be capable of evacuating British subjects. Para 32 of the MOD paper DSWP(P)21 states: "At the request of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence is committed to assist, should the need arise, with the evacuation of friendly nationals and British nationals and British subjects.... from 64 foreign countries". It may be that, now that Britain is no longer a world power which would in any case have forces available in every corner of the globe, the time has come for the FCO to withdraw its general request to the MOD to provide this capability. This would not of course preclude assistance with emergency evacuation being given by HM forces in cases where such forces were available.
103. The FCO naturally has a more particular interest in the evacuation capability. But the whole field of decisions about the future flexibility in HM forces, and of the conclusions to be drawn about future training, research and development spending, support costs and advance procurement, is one in which the FCO interest is closely involved. The basic issue is of the priorities for defence spending at a time when the money available is limited, and defence priorities are and must be intimately linked with foreign priorities.
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/104.
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