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OUR REINFORCEMENT AND/OR ASSAULT FORCES TOGETHER WITH ASSOCIATED SEA AND AIRLIFTS, THEIR ROLES AND COMMITMENTS INCLUDING THE FUNCTION OF RESPONDING TO THE UNFORESEEN
UNITED NATIONS COMMITMENTS
95. By mid-1974, the United Nations force in Cyprus will have been reduced to 2400 men, of which the British contingent will comprise approximately 750. It is assumed that Ministers would not wish to withdraw this contingent entirely in view of their
How- declared support for the United Nations and peacekeepir g. ever, the Americans are already pressing the UN Secretary-General for further reductions in the force. Their ideas probably involve an observer force, consisting primarily of officers, not larger than 1000 (of which the British contingent might then be perhaps 250 or 300). Provided conditions on the Island remain stable, such a plan would probably be acceptable to Greece and Cyprus, and with UK support, the aggressive US diplomacy we expect could probably push the scheme through. There would be opposition from Turkey, who pays nothing for UNFICYP but regards it as an import- ant safeguard for the Turkish Cypriot community; but our support for the scheme would probably not do much damage to Ang lo-Turkish relations since it would be clear that the Americans were the prime
movers.
96. Such a policy would have to be reviewed if there were an in- crease in tension between the two communities in Cyprus and/or between Greece and Turkey.
97. The Beira patrol is in some ways an onerous and wasteful commitment, However, it is operated under a resolution of the UN Security Council, and to abandon it unilaterally would be widely perceived as an important change in British policy towards both Rhodesia and the United Nations. If it were desired to abandon it, it would be better to try to do this through a new UN Security Council resolution which would call for a tightening of sanctions against Rhodesia in other ways.
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/CONCLUSION:
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