TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 191

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79. In the event of reductions we should also need to consult with our NATO Allies in view of the NATO aspects. This would best be done in the context of overall consultations with NATO about the implications of the Defence Review.

80. If it were decided to maintain the garrison in Gibraltar more or less unchanged an early public announcement to this effect should be made in order to prevent unnecessary anxiety in Gibraltar and in the UK over the possible consequences for Gibraltar of the Defence

Review.

81.

A difficult situation could arise if a political solution to the problem of Gibraltar acceptable to all concerned were in pros- pect. But that is most unlikely to happen in the foreseable future. CONCLUSION: GIBRALTAR

82.

MALTA

a) For so long as it remains HMG's policy not to allow Gibraltar to revert to Spain against the wishes of the people, it will be only prudent to retain a garrison there; b) There is little scope for financial saving by re- ducing the garrison;

c) Any reduction in the British presence would require careful consultation with the Gibraltarians, who would be concerned about both the political and the economic impli-

cations.

a) In the event of reductions, we should also consult

with our NATO Allies;

e) If it were decided to maintain the garrison unchanged, there should be an early public announcement to this effect; f) No generally acceptable political solution to the Gibraltar problem is likely in the foreseeable future.

83. The agony of negotiating the Military Facilities Agreement in 1972 is well known. To try to terminate it would undoubtedly involve futher confrontations with Mr Mintoff, considerable waste of ministerial time, and probably the great expense of compensating Malta for the loss of future revenue from the Agreement which any proposal for termination would undoubtedly involve.

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/84.