TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 187

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CONCLUSION:

65.

BELIZE

THE CARIBBEAN AND BERMUDA

We should:

(a)

(b)

(c)

seek the views of the US Government before taking any final decision;

accept that our legal commitment to the defence of Bermuda, the Caribbean dependent territories and the WIAS will continue;

accept that our ability to defend these territories and our contingent ability to intervene internally

will be reduced.

+

66. HMG has an absolute commitment to the defence of Belize

The Guatemalan laim repre- because it is a dependent territory. sents an active external threat to the territory. The present garrison of 600 men is of the minimum size necessary to hold the territory in the event of a Guatemalan attack, since any smaller garrison would not be able to hold strategic points, in particular

It is considered the airport, until reinforcements had arrived.

likely that if the garrison were withdrawn, or reduced in size, the new Guatemalan Government which comes to office on 1 July would

If such a take- give serious consideration to a takeover of Belize.

over occurred, HMG's commitment to the defence of the territory could be met only by a retaking operation, which would be costly and difficult.

67. While therefore it would be possible to withdraw the garrison while maintaining the defence commitment, to do so would imply acceptance of the risk that a Guatemalan takeover might place HMG in the position of having to choose between mounting a retaking If operation and abandoning a dependent territory to its fate. the latter course were adopted, this would inevitably incur very considerable public and parliamentary odium in the UK. putation abroad would also suffer severely.

HMG's re-

There would be hostile

reactions in many countries, particularly the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, and perhaps also in the United Nations. Confidence in HMG in other dependent territories would also be

shaken.

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/68.

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