TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 177

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28. One particular question which should be addressed in such a review is that of the implications of the likely granting of independence to the Seychelles. It is epuceivable that the independent government might seek a defence agreement with the UK in return for agreeing not to grant facilities to the Russians. Consideration would have to be given to the question of whether HMG could enter into such an agreement even though there might be no forces available to meet any resulting commitment.

MAURITIUS

29. As a result of the Anglo-Mauritian Agreement, we are able to (a) station troops on the island in peace and war

(b) operate a communications centre, HMS Mauritius

(c)

exert some influence on the Mauritians in preventing the Communist powers from obtaining significant facilities there (a) is of no practical importance; (b) may become operationally unnecessary if satellite facilities become available in the Indian Ocean, or if our requirements in the area are considerably reduced (c) has become increasingly important in the context of Anglo- American co-operation.

30. HMG makes no payment to the Mauritius Government for the Defence Agreement (which can be terminated at 12 months' notice by either party). The "cost" to HMG is an obligation to consult in the event of external threat or internal disorder. This obligation does not require any special contingency expenditure, since there is no specific commitment to provide positive assistance. Our response to any request would depend on the circumstances of the situation and the availability of British troops at the time. Though the with- drawal of HMS Mauritius would represent a saving of operational costs (whatever "compensation" might be extracted from HMG in the shape of extra aid), the cancellation of the Defence Agreement would not in itself result in any tangible saving. The political value (paragraph 26c) means that relations with the Mauritian Government will have to be handled tactfully and in close consultation with the Americans.

CONCLUSION: MAURITIUS

31.

There would be no financial gain for HMG, and some political loss, in terminating the Anglo-Mauritian defence agreement.

If

/this

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