TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 136

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Defence

[MR. MALLALIEU.]

13 MAY 1974

an assumption that there would be no major conflict within the next 10 years. Despite what the hon. Member for Haltemprice has said I should think that today it is possible to extend that period. I very much doubt that there will be a major conflict within

within my lifetime- although that is a fairly short period

now.

Mr. Wall: I accept what the hon. Gentleman has said. However, he will recall that I said that I did not think there would be any war in central Europe because such a war would go nuclear and no one wants that. Will the hon. Gentleman address his thoughts to the flanks and the problems of oil supplies? Without those supplies NATO armies cannot move after 16 days.

Mr. Mallalieu: I shall certainly come to the matter of oil supplies. The flanks are part of the West as a whole-so long as we do not outflank our flanks by going all over the world.

If we have a limit on our commitments

and if we can accept that the threat of a major conflict, at any rate in the West, is less immediate than it was, perhaps 15 years ago or certainly 25 years ago, what sort of savings can we reasonably expect to make upon defence, in addition to those which have already been made by the previous administration and by the administration of 1964-70?

I want to begin by mentioning one thing on which I hope we shall not economise-research and development. Things move so fast in defence matters nowadays that anyone who leaves the Services is totally out of date within a couple of years. It would be a tragedy if an emergency were to loom larger than it does at present and we began to expand our forces but then found our- selves so far behind on weaponry that we could not equip our men satisfactorily. Nor do I want to see indiscriminate cutting across the board. I agree with

some hon. Members that we should not set a total for our cuts. To say that one- third must come from the Army, one- third from the Royal Air Force and one- third from the Royal Navy would be a stupid way of setting about it. What is essential is that we should provide our- selves with forces which are not only capable of rapid expansion but also whose

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shape, as opposed to size, is right. I would have thought that, in naval terms, that would mean a far greater concen- tration upon submarines than on surface vessels.

If we are to do this, the only area in which we shall get a real saving is in single item of expenditure in the defence manpower, which represents the highest

budget. I believe that we ought to try to save on manpower. The Secretary of State is complaining, as many others are, that recruitment is not as good as it should be. I am not disturbed by that, provided that long-term re-engagements are taken in sufficient number. I would like to cut down recruitment drives at present and step up the inducements to re- engagement and to long-term service.

the

I am very much surprised that no men- tion so far has been made about oil sup- plies, except those coming from Middle East. I understand that we are to have oil supplies from another area in four to six years. I hope that my right hon. Friend is paying strict attention to the ways and means by which we are going to protect those supplies. I do not think that such protection will come from conventional forces as we know them. I cannot see our frigates cruising or our air- craft flying round and round the oil fields on continuous patrol. I do not think that we shall protect our oil supplies in that way.

I do not think that, except in terms of a major conflict, they will be at risk from the sort of enemies against whom the Forces of the Crown are normally de- ployed. I am much more concerned about the possibilities of guerrilla sabo- tage-not coming necessarily from Russia: I think that it is much more likely from other quarters.

I believe that it will be necessary, in order adequately to safeguard our sup- plies, to develop a special force which is neither army nor navy, nor air force. It will have to be a force one of whose main weapons is bound to be intelligence, finding out in the rough, hostile quarters of the world whatever information it can get about prospective descents upon our oil supplies. It will have to be a force highly skilled in using detection equip- ment, more likely from beneath the sea. I hope that, in considering defence expenditure and preparing the White