TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 111

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Mal ta

(xii)

Option A1 would involve a major row with Mintoff who

would have a case for taking us to the International Court.

It would also be extremely unwelcome to our NATO Allies who

share the larger part of the subsidy which is the counterpart

of the retention of our forces in Malta. The potential cash

costs in terms of redundancy payments, compensation to Malta, etc could at least equal any savings. Provided Option A2 is carried out in accordance with the military Facilities Agreement, it is unlikely to arouse objections from Mintoff, but some of

our NATO Allies, particularly the Italians, would certainly

express concern.

Gibraltar

(xiii) Option A1 is not in practice an option since it might

tempt the Spaniards to attempt a coup de main. Even if it did

not, it would be seen in Gibraltar as implying abandonment by

HMG of their commitments to the people of Gibraltar. A decision

not to retain the dockyard would have a disastrous effect on

Gibraltar's economy and might involve us in aid expenditure to

an equivalent sum. Option A2 involves no change from our

present posture.

The Caribbean and South Atlantic

(xiv) Both Options involve the risks that the Argentinians

will take over the Falkland Islands and that the Guatemalans

will take over Belize while they remain British dependent

territories, but Option A1 makes this virtually certain while

Option A2 provides some limited opportunity for tying to settle

both disputes diplomatically. Apart from the domestic considera-

tions the takeover of these two British dependent territorien

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BARANGAL ACHNERİNER Urinal

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