TNAG-0464-FCO40-529-Entitlement-of-Hong-Kong-to-EEC-Generalised-Scheme-of-Prefer-1974 — Page 32

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might not in the end prove very lucrative. It was however important not to leave people in Hong Kong with the impression that there was no movement to help them. He would be trying to draft something. econd, there would be need for a statement when the GDP decision was known to explain it in terms presenting G and the Hong Hong Government suitably.

There was a minor point of procedure. lie would much like to know very quick after the event when he could make use of helpful statements made in eg Coreper in defence of Hong Kong interests, with guidance as to the type of use that could be made, ie full publicity, background briefing, EXCO only, etc.

It was unfortunately not true that the Department of Trade had fully grasped the Hong Kong viewpoint, as he had learned in conversation. Hong Kong did not welcome one particular negotiating objective of the Department of Trade which the DOT had thought would be right up their street.

The Hong Kong USA Agreement (about which I asked him) had also been misunderstood in London. I will spare the details as a copy of the agreement and a briefing is being given to the Department of Trade and Hong Kong will speak to it in Brussels. The short point was that the agreement gave Hong Kong substantially more than the arrangement which it immediately followed for example, if Hong Kong could supply, the right to provide 4 square yards of cloth a year to every inhabitant of the United States, with a growth factor for future years, and the right to shift out of the basket given percentages of basket goods into specified categories.

The terms of the Commission's mandate for negotiations were all-important. He hoped they would indeed be mutually acceptable and that the awkward situation would not arise in which Hong kong found itself obliged to decline to negotiate. He reckoned that the generality of those concerned in long hong would expect, or strongly hope, that the UK would refuse to agree to a mandate which was unduly restrictive.

The impression I got was that Mr Jordan is finding his visit useful in enabling him to put straight some misconceptions of fact about Hong Kong views. But that as far as GCP is concerned he does not expect very much for 1975. And that one of his major objectives is to ensure that the best possible presentation is made for Hong Kong consumption of decisions taken in the C.

23 October 1974

Copies to:

Sir D Watron Kr Marshall

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