TNAG-0464-FCO40-529-Entitlement-of-Hong-Kong-to-EEC-Generalised-Scheme-of-Prefer-1974 — Page 122

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TRAN'S EMPHASIS WAS ON THE FIRST TWO COUNTRIES.

REITERATED OUR OPPOSITION TO THE ENTIRE SUPER-COMPETITIVE

CONCEPT.

7. HE ADMITTED THAT THE CERMANS AT LEAST WERE OPPOSED TO

THIS NEW SELF-LIVITATION PROPOSAL AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE

IN VIEW OF THE APPARENT SHIFT IN CONTROL AND THAT SOME

OTHERS WERE ALSO UNEASY ABOUT IT FOR ONE REASON OR

ANOTHER.

8. TRAN CLAIMED THAT THE ADVANTAGES IN OUR CONCEDING

TO SOME SUCH SELF-LITATION ARRANGEMENTS WERE

(1) THE CONSEQUENT HOPE THAT SPECIAL BUTOIRS WOULD

NOT BECOME EVEN MORE OF AN OBSTACLE TO CUR 1975 TRADE

WITH THE EEC THAN UNDER THE COMMISSION'S PRESENT PROPOSALS,

AND

(11) SOME DIRECT CONTROL OF THE MANAGEMENT OF A SHARE

OF THE TARIFF QUOTAS, 1.E. SOME MEASURE OF EXPORT CONTROL.

9.

TRAN CONTINUALLY STRESSED THAT THE GSP CUTCOME WOULD

NOW BE A MATTER OF POLITICAL MUSCLE. THE UNCERTAINTLY

OVER BRITAIN'S FUTURE OUTWEIGHED ANY SYMPATHIES OVER

HONG KONG'S DISCRIMIRATION PROBLEMS.

13. HE DID NOT GO QUITE SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT HONG

KONG WOULD IN HIS VIEW AT ONCE CEAUE TO BE ANY SORT OF

GSP BENEFICIARY IN THE EEC IN THE EVENT OF BRITISH.

WITHDRAWAL BUT I FEEL HE INTENDED ME TO INFER AS MUCH.

11. I TOLD TRAN THAT WHEN THE LATEST PROPOSALS ON THE 1975 EEC/GSP TEXTILES POSITION (ALREADY KNOWN TO US)

BECAME PUBLIC IN HONG KONG THERE COULD BE A VERY STRONG

ADVERSE REACTION WHICH MIGHT WELL AFFECT ALL FUTURE-

TEXTILES RELATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND THE EEC. THE

FOSSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT BEING FORCED TO REMOVE ALL

UNILATERAL RESTRICTIONS ON TEXTILES EXPORTS TO THE EEC

SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKER. 11 SUCH A CLIMATE HIS LATEST

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