TNAG-0436-FCO40-501-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-international-organisations-1973 — Page 31

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5. The most compelling argument would seem the second. A

co-operative stance towards the Committee of 24, together with other likely policy modifications, would demonstrate the Government's readiness to put into action their declared intention

of attaching greater importance to the United Nations.

6.

The third (negative) argument seems in general to be sound,

though our presence may encourage members of the Committee to

use us as an Aunt Sally and we may be faced with some difficult pressures over visiting missions (see paragraphs 20-23).

It is

7. The first argument is less persuasive. Despite the more favour-

able trend of the short and inconclusive discussion on 4 April

in the Committee, there are so far only tentative signs of any change in the Committee's rigid insistence on immediate independence (or incorporation into a neighbouring state)

regardless of the wishes of the peoples concerned.

possible that greater overall co-operation on our part might induce some increased flexibility towards territories where

there is unanimous opposition to independence, and help to discourage the Committee's more illogical tendencies (eg the last minute demand last year for a referendum and visiting

mission for Pitcairn). On the other hand, we must expect the Committee in considering our smaller dependent territories to

maintain its general ideological commitment to independence, to continue to condemn foreign economic interests and exploi- tation of natural resources, to criticise military bases including BIOT, to back any call for independence or constitu- tional change even from a small minority in a territory, and

/to support

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