TNAG-0429-FCO40-494-Programme-Analysis-and-Review-(PAR)-Future-of-Dependent-Terr-1974 — Page 60

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given some support to the efforts of the Administering Powers to keep Resolution 1541 alive. In the single case of New Zealand's arrangements with the Cook Islands they even defeated the Communists and gave the associati on a grudging acceptance (1965). In several other cases they have obliged the extremists to take a more moderate line so as to hold the anti-colonialist majority together.

36. In the case of our Caribbean Associated States, however, the

extremists have so far had most of the game. Since most of the

other Administering Powers are in the same position as we are with

few territories capable of independence and many permanently

dependent this is likely to prove a test case. If the U.N. finds some neens of recognizing the Associated States there will be some

hope of gradually hammering out with them a solution to the problem

of the international standing of small communities that cannot

sustain full nationhood. If not, the Administering Powers will have to make their em arrangements in each territory, disregarding

the Committee of 24 and even, if necessary, the General Assembly.

37. In the former case the territories would in some sense have

found "a status under the U.N.", but the phrase is more often used to describe a (hypothetical) situation in which the U.N. accepts or shares direct responsibility for a territory. The Charter provides for the Administering Powers to put their territories voluntarily under U.N. trusteeship. But if having done so we continued to be the Administering Power our responsibilities in the territories would be no less, while our difficulties would be considerably increased by new obligations to submit detailed reports on the territories and admit Visiting Hissions. The chances that friendly states would take over our territories under trusteeship agreements are probably less, and certainly no more, than the slin chances that they would take over from us without U.N. inter- vention (sce paragraphs 30 to 33 above). As

for direct U.N. administration, the U.N. has neither the finance, the staff nor the administrative machinery required; and there is no serious likelihood that the General Assembly would agree to set

up such an organisation.

.

38. It is no use therefore looking to the U.N. to relieve us of our obligations to the territories. We shall be lucky if we can gradually bring the majority of the U.N. to accept the proposition that small territories are unsuited to independent nationhood and

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