TNAG-0429-FCO40-494-Programme-Analysis-and-Review-(PAR)-Future-of-Dependent-Terr-1974 — Page 30

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V.

vi.

the UK, or to some other friendly country willing to receive them. This is obviously a policy of last resort but it may be appropriate, eg in the case of Pitcairn.

Associated Statehood with the UK (as in the case of the five West Indian Associated States):

This option enables either the territory or the UK

to initiate a move to full independence. The experience of the Caribbean suggests that this arrangement is liable to leave HMG with potentially

embarrassing responsibilities for defence and external affairs, but without sufficient control,

eg over internal security and finance, to enable us to prevent circumstances arising which might

necessitate our intervention. It also leaves us

with a heavy continuing burden of aid, because other donors still regard the territories as ours, and we are liable to be called upon to support or rescue schemes initiated by local Ministers.

Integration with the UK.

This solution, which implies positive willingness on the part of HMG to retain the territory indefinitely, is theoretically feasible in the case of very isolated territories with small or no population, and with no realistic prospects of separate independence (eg Pitcairn, Tristan da Cunha or even St Helena). Even in such cases we would have to be careful to ensure that integration would not give rise to embarrassing precedents in relation to territories which might find some such

solution attractive, but which HMG would not want to absorb. Thus integration could be extremely expensive in populous territories, and politically impracticable in the case of territories claimed by third countries, eg the Falklands and Gibraltar.

vii. Continued Dependency

An alternative to integration, especially for

territories in which the UK has defence communications, scientific or commercial interests to protect; this option might create difficulties

Al

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