TNAG-0429-FCO40-494-Programme-Analysis-and-Review-(PAR)-Future-of-Dependent-Terr-1974 — Page 28

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

(17259) Dd.897459 250m 12/72 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863 (16941) Dd.897300 250m 9/72 G.W.B.Ltd.

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expectation fostered in the territories themselves by the last century of British colonial administration, and for that matter also with the anti-colonialist attitudes

of most members of the United Nations. But our own interests in "accelerated decolonisation" may not always coincide with those of the dependent peoples.

Separate Independence

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10. In those territories whose independence would not significantly prejudice the interests of the inhabitants, however, that is those which have reasonable prospects of becoming viable politically and self-sufficient economically, it would be logical actively to promote e desire for indépendence even if this does not already exist, and our aid and information policies should be directed to this end. Where the UK is likely to have residual interests in a territory after independence, or there is persistent local reluctance to seek independence we may have to offer special inducements, eg in terms of aid, a minimal defence guarantee (although successive British administrations have sought to avoid this), the offer of assistance in the conduct of external

affairs. This last may be attractive to small territories with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants, which - as micro-states may find it difficult or may not wish to proceed to full UN membership after independence. New Zealand's 1962 treaty with Western Samoa may provide a useful precedent. It provides that the metropolitan power will "consult on matters of mutual interest and concern", undertake consular protection and act as an agent in foreign affairs when requested to do so.

It may be desirable to try to secure from another friendly power in the region some kind of commitment to the defence of the newly independent territory, since any residual UK defence commitment might seriously undermine the assumed benefits to the UK of granting independence.

11. But we may not be justified in trying to persuade territories such as those listed in paragraph 7 above int separate independence; in these cases it may be right to seek rather to give aid at a higher level than would otherwise be appropriate, in order to create tolerable

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