TNAG-0427-FCO40-492-Proposed-constitutional-advancement-of-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 63

CONFIDENTIAL

?

(improbable

in any circunsiences)

RE.

173

(a) for Peking at any rate there might well be a link between the questions of

constitutional advance and representation

in Hong Kong. Certainly such a view would be consistent with point (c) above;

(e)

the opportunities for discussing such matters relatively freely and frankly with the PRC leaders may now be better than for some time in the past and perhaps for the future. If the question of a visit by the new Prime Minister to Peking is raised there might be an opportunity to elicit a rather more up-to-date account of PRC views than those listed in 1971 which are at best 10 to 15 years out of date now;

(f) during the next few years the Mao era is likely to come to an end. Even if succeeded by Chou and a continuation of present policies the era can hardly be guaranteed to continue beyond the end of the present decade.

It may

be therefore that we cannot give much con- sideration to likely Chinese reactions in the medium term as these might go in any direction regardless of whether limited constitutional advance has or has not taken place with Peking's acquiescence;

(g) presumably one of our chief concerns is to avoid embarking down a road along which we would be unable to reverse because of increasing Hong Kong pressures to advance further, but which might at the same time lead to increasing Peking pressure to retreat. As pointed out above we may nonetheless have to face increased PRC pressures on Hong Kong by the end of the decade. There might accordingly be something to be said for allowing for greater Chinese participation in the Government of Hong Kong so that they themselves were involved in the reaction to such pressure. What I have in mind is that it may appear relatively easy for the Chinese in Hong Kong to complain about British actions or reactions in relation to Peking but they could hardly hope themselves, if fully involved in the decision-making process, to stand out against Peking ie there would be pressure on the Chinese in Hong Kong themselves not to try to advance constitutionally too far or too fast. For a start Peking has the ability to take direct action against Hong Kong in a way that is perhaps not open to HMG, and furthermore there must in the end be a choice between the harmonious absorption of Hong Kong into China and a violent one. It might

CONFIDENTIAL

/just