TNAG-0424-FCO40-470-Construction-of-an-underground-railway-system-in-Hong-Kong-1973 — Page 105

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A

that the British Group should proceed to deliver their response.

Mr. Haddon-Cave wondered whether, before doing so, the British Group might not wish to read through the two documents he had

handed over, in case they might wish to modify their response

in the light of the fuller documentation now available on the Government's requirements. Mr. Wiltshire said he would prefer the response to be delivered as it had been prepared, but agreed

that a brief recess to allow the British Group to peruse the

documents might be helpful,

The British Group's Response

4.

Following a 15-minute recess, the British Group delivered their response to Mr. Haddon-Cave's letter of 1st August.

5.

The full text of the E & M sub-group's response, as written

and delivered by Mr. Scott, is at Annex A. The following comments

were made in the course of delivery:

•

(a) With reference to paragraph 2 of the response, Mr Haddon-

Cave said the MTSG could see very little scope in prac-

tical terms for the quality or quantity of E & M supplies

to be traded off against the price.

(b) As regards paragraph 3, Mr. Haddon-Cave said a lumpsum

contract, which was the most extreme form the ceiling price concept could take, would be acceptable to the

MTSG.

(c) On paragraph 4, Mr. Haddon-Cave accepted that cases of force majeure could not be limited quantitively in advance, and pointed out that the Government did not require such a limit. It was a requirement, however,

that cases of force majeure should be limited qualita-

tively, so to speak, by carefully defining the scope of

the force majeure clause.

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