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to involve China more actively in the fight against narcotic abuse, I indicated that the issue was being considered in London also.
13. I enquired what the Americans saw as the advantages of involving China either in the Narcotics Commission or on the INCB. They seemed to think the main advantage would arise because the Chinese have some control over the "White Flag" insurgents in the hill countries of Burma, Thailand and Laos. If these groups could be dissuaded from action, the locals would have a better chance of bringing these areas under control without having to use irregular troops over whom they had little or no control. Both the irregulars and the insurgents in these areas maintained themselves to a great extent by opium-growing. Secondly, it was thought that, because of the general Chinese influence in South East Asia, the countries of the area would be more inclined to take action against the opium traffic if the Chinese showed some concern. However, Ingersoll, who had spoken to the Chinese observer at the Narcotics Commission, and Pickering had some doubts whether the Chinese really had very much interest in the suppression of opium trafficking; in particular Ingersoll said that the Chinese had indicated to him that they were not interested in bilaterol initiatives; cooperation should come from multilateral and international activities. Thirdly, the involvement of the Chinese might be of assistance to Hong Kong, since there was some evidence that the Thai trawlers which brought the opium and morphine base to Hong Kong off-loaded to local trawlers in Chinese territorial waters close to the Lema islands, which are immediately to the south of the Colony. When this point was probed, it became clear that the evidence was by no means well established, and furthermore that the Hong Kong Government was extremely cautious about the proposition that the Chinese should be invited to co-operate in stopping shipping close to Hong Kong. As I understood it, the question of Hong Kong territoral waters was a long standing source of trouble.
14.
On balance it was felt that a direct approach to Chine through the diplomatic channels to find out what their attitude was and to urge them to become involved was unlikely to produce positive results. A better approach might be to develop interest through informal discussions at Embassy level in countries in South East Asia whenever the opportunity presented itself.
United Nations in SE Asia
15. There followed some discussion of the work of the United Nations in South East Asia. It was thought that the Burmese now accepted the proposal for a crop substitution programme.
It was the view of the United States that the United Nations presented the best chance of making progress in Burma, although the political situation in the countries made it highly unlikely that any speedy advance could be made. An interesting aspect of this discussion was that Pickering threw some doubt on the success of the crop substitution programme, It seemed that a lot of money and hope had been invested in it without adequate consideration being given to the conse- quences of changing a crop in a particular area or to the type of crop that would best grow there and be marketable. There was now a highland research station in Thailand which was
examining these problems, but solutions were unlikely to be quickly
reached.
Anglo/US consortium for the preemptive buying of opium
16. Rolph put forward his proposal that there should be an Anglo/American Consortium for the preemptive buying of opiumn for a short period in Thailand. This suggestion
was received with little enthusiasm by the Americans and the United Kingdom. The difficulties that arose with the Single Convention were referred to; the possibility ✓ that it would simply encourage the growth of opium without control was stressed; and the point was made that this could not be limited to Thailand alone. If the
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