SECRET
members might be less disposed to have us on the sub-commission
when it was formed. Mr Stuart doubted this and suggested that
there was a useful precedent in the law enforcement officer who
had attended the Near East committee as an adviser to the Swedish
delegation. He could not see why members of the ad hoc committee
should object to the UK having the dual rôle of ring holders and representatives of Hong Kong's interests. From our point of view the main danger might be that China would object to too explicit representation of Hong Kong by the UK. Mr Train thought that other nations might not take us as being dispassionate if Hong Kong was seen to be advising us. But he agreed that we
could not assess the likelihood of this from London.
8.
Mr Stuart then summed up as follows:
(a)
It was agreed that HMG had an interest in the
Hong Kong drug trafficking problem both because of our responsibility for Hong Kong and because of the dangers of an overspill reaching the UK.
(b) There was no need for the FCO to propose sub- missions to Home Office Ministers as they had already hoisted in the seriousness of the problem.
(c) Any approaches to Burma, Thailand and Laos might
(a)
best be considered in the context of the ad hoc committee rather than bilaterally from the UK.
The idea of liaison officers in Thailand would have been discussed by the Hong Kong Commissioner for Narcotics during his visits to the area. The possibility of an approach to the Americans could be further considered when his report was received.
(e) An additional contribution to the Special Fund was
not considered necessary at the moment.
(f) He would ask the Hong Kong Government whether they
considered it important that an adviser from Hong Kong should be attached to the ad hoc committee. If so, he would ask our Embassies in the countries
- 5 -
SECRET
/of the
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.