TNAG-0414-FCO40-460-Review-of-narcotics-problem-in-Hong-Kong-1973 — Page 5

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B Burma

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Mr Rolph has recommended (b) that we approach the Burmese Government. You will have seen a copy of HM Ambassador's (Rangoon) letter of 1 February to SEAD advising against such an approach. We would echo his

reservations.

The Burmese Government is utterly opposed to illicit opium traffic. But it has many problems (please see Mr Rolph's para 13) in attempting to curb the illicit supply of opium from its area of the "Golden Triangle". The Burmese have said (partly to allay international criticism) that they will do what they can themselves; they maintain however that one of the most effective ways of curtailing opium supply is for others to prohibit the lucrative arms and cash/opium trade which originates

in Thailand.

The Burmese have made it clear that they will not accept bilateral help on this issue; for example. they rejected Mr Nelson Gross' efforts of last June to persuade them to accept US military aid to help them police opium areas. There are signs, however, that the Burmese will accept UN help a promising step forward which we should encourage.

Were we to decline to make the official approach suggested by Mr Rolph and the Governor at Hong Kong it might appear that we are letting the Burmese off too lightly. There is a view that the more countries who expr- ess concern the more the Burmese will react positively to adverse international publicity. But as HM Ambassador points out, this would not be so. An official approach by us is unlikely to increase the pace of Burma's efforts to solve this problem and may well retard the progress already made by UN officials.

C Laos

We agree with the comments of HM Ambassador Vientiane (his letter of 13 February to Sir Murray Maclehose) on Mr Rolph's suggestion (d) that we approach the Laotian Government. We endorse his view that any approach that were made would be unlikely to achieve much, if anything. It might lend respectable support to the Americans but given the political situation in Laos, the fact that opium is one of the Laos' staple crops and, finally, the natural indolence of the Laos, we doubt if it would amount to more than moral support. However, in the wider context envisaged by Governor Hong Kong there would be sense in putting the Laos on notice that the Hong Kong authorities were serious. So, on balance, we think that the approach should be made.

AR. Michael

A R Michael

South East Asian Department

23 March 1973

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