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suggested three areas where attention should be focused during the new campaign.
(1) Interrogation of those arrested should be improved with the aim of unraveling trafficking rings;
(2) Customs controls over the Vietnamese military, especially the Air Force, should be tightened; and
(3) Customs inspections of Free World Forces entering Viet- nam, especially Korean and Thai forces, should be required. GVN officials acknowledged that the above subjects were still sig- nificant problem areas. With respect to the Vietnamese Air Force, Viet- namese officials stated that there were too many military airfields (about 300) and too few customs officials. Thai military flights also con- tinue to be a serious problem, but the GVN had not approached the Thai Government because the subject was too sensitive.
According to U.S. Embassy officials, under the terms of agreements, governments of the free world forces entering Vietnam are responsible for customs inspections of their own troops. Although records show that such customis inspections are made, U.S. officials believe that large- scale smuggling still persists among those forces.
The MACV Coordinator for Drug Suppression told General Accounting Office (GAO) investigators that, despite all efforts of the United States and GVN to stop trafficking, only an insignificant amount of heroin had actually been interdicted and seized. He ex- pressed the opinion that, even if they were totally successful in prevent- ing heroin from entering Vietnam, there was enough heroin incountry to keep every soldier high until the last U.S. serviceman was with- drawn from South Vietnam."
By August 1972 the combined U.S.-GVN antidrug campaign in- volved, on an organizational level, almost every aspect of the two gov- ernments. On the American side, the military, BNDD, Customs, and AID had developed significant ongoing capabilities incountry.
GOVERNMENT OF SOUTII VIETNAM ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
Little drug suppression occurred in Vietnam prior to 1954, when opium and marijuana prohibitions first appeared. Early enforcement was ineffective due to public and official indifference. Although the GVN has now publicly denounced drug abuse, the average Vietnamese citizen remains quite ignorant of the seriousness of the drug threat, and some have become involved in the drug trade unknowingly. Others engage in drug trafficking at various levels for its quick and high profit. For example, according to MACV sources, a kilo of heroin which sells for $1,600 in Bangkok or Vientiane sells for $11,000 on the streets of Saigon.
Despite the opium-permissive environment in Vietnam, the GVN, at the United States urging, has made some significant efforts and accomplishments. In the area of U.S.-GVN cooperation, police nar- cotics suppression efforts are integrated with U.S. civil and military efforts. For example, BNDD agents, U.S. Customs officials, and U.S. AID public safety experts work directly with their Vietnamese coun- terparts.
* Several MACV, BNDD U.S. Customs officials are also of the opinion that large stores of No. 4 heroin remain sequestered in the Cholon area.
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