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stated further that if the Embassy in Bangkok recommended that SNO be furnished with fixed wing and rotary aircraft, such action would be approved."
An air capability would enable SNO to conduct surveillance opera- tions over a wider area. It would also give the unit a capability to establish mobile roadblocks, particularly in the mountains, and it would generally facilitate operations.
For example, one village was raided in June and opium confiscated. It took the raiding party, which was accompanied by a BNDD agent, a full half day to walk to the village, although it was in sight of the main highway between Chiang Rai and Mae Sai.
Opiates are brought down from Burma by mule train along remote mountain trails. If SNO had helicopters, it could establish roadblocks along the trails by landing police officers in front of and behind the caravan, thus trapping the traflickers.
SNO also needs weapons. Some of the insurgents and Burmese dis- sidents engaged in narcotics smuggling are armed with modern U.S.- and Soviet-made weapons such as M-16 rifles, AK-47's, M-79 grenade launchers, etc. Yet in Chiang Rai, there was only one carbine for the SNO officer and the five men stationed there.
SNO headquarters also needs additional vehicles of a different type than at present. They are now equipped with six Jeep Wagoneers which were surplus to U.S. AID requirements, and a Landrover which is too distinctive for efficient covert operations. What is needed are a number of smaller Japanese-made vehicles similar to other auto- mobiles in the area.
There is a difference of opinion between BNDD and U.S. Agency for International Development personnel in Thailand as to what kind of assistance the United States should furnish to SNO.
For example, SNO has paid for the installations, the radios, and most of its operating costs of SNO. AID, on the other hand, has been unwilling to pay for this kind of local currency costs. It is their opin- ion that the United States should pay the foreign exchange costs of the program while the Thais should pay the baht costs.
This situation is aggravated by the fact that BNDD is interested in developing SNO into an effective narcotics suppression organization immediately while AID is more interested in developing the entire Thai police apparatus into an efficient, effective institution. While there is no basic disagreement between AID and BNDD on the end objective, there is disagreement as to what kind of assistance the United States should provide.
BNDD and other U.S. officials in Thailand attribute the restricted movement of opium in northern Thailand to the manner in which SNO has conducted its operations.
Thai enforcement officials have established roadblocks in the north- ern areas. Vehicles and trucks are monitored and inspected. These pro- cedures combined with other SNO operations are considered to be a deterrent to opium smuggling.
Although it will be a long time before SNO becomes the effective police force envisioned, it has great potential providing that it can
In December 1972 a Cabinet Committee Working Group subcommittee voted to supply aircraft to SNO. The vote was 7 in favor and 1 against. The AID representative cast the dissenting vote.
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