TNAG-0414-FCO40-460-Review-of-narcotics-problem-in-Hong-Kong-1973 — Page 164

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sides of the Thai-Burmese border. The Thai Government allows him such latitude because his anti-Communist stance is seen as yet another buffer protecting the Thais from Communist inspired insurgency. Ob- viously, this arrangement angers the Burmese and impedes any pos- sible cooperation between the two countries to eliminate the cross- border opium/heroin traffic.

Apart from the support given U Nu by the Thais, he also receives considerable external monetary support which he utilizes to procure

arms.

Earlier this year, U.S. sources estimated that U Nu would run out of operating expenses in May. However, this did not occur for he again received sufficient external aid to continue his operations.

In the three instances described above, the recipients of the arms have been and still are involved in the opium trade which in the Golden Tri- angle area has enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with arms smuggling; i.e., opium is often bartered for guns or it provides cash with which arms are purchased.

The problem of stanching the illicit arms flow in Southeast Asia is enormous given the numbers of weapons made available by wartime conditions. In addition, the triborder area, particularly the Thai- Burmese border, is extremely rough terrain where policing is inade- quate.

Given the close relationship of the arms traffic and the opium trade in Burma and elsewhere in the triborder area, and given the abun- dance of U.S. supplied weapons, a greater effort should be made both to gather intelligence involving arms traffic and, if necessary, to enforce MAP regulations more stringently.

AMERICAN-BURMESE RELATIONS

Another factor hindering the effort to curb the flow of opiates from Burma is the status of United States-Burma relations. Unlike the U.S. presence in Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, the Ameri- can profile in Burma is extremely low. Apart from the United States Embassy in Rangoon and a Consulate in Mandalay, there is no U.S. AID program nor is there a military assistance program (MAP).

Whereas the comparatively high level of U.S. activity in Laos, Thai- land, Cambodia, and South Vietnam provides U.S. envoys some lever- age in those countries, the U.S. Ambassador in Rangoon has virtually none. Currently, in the former countries, the U.S. has specific bilateral narcotics control programs which provide training for local personnel, in-country U.S. narcotics experts and enforcement personnel, support for local enforcement efforts, and in one instance, a program for in- country addict treatment.

Unfortunately the Burmese Government is unwilling to modify its rigid policy of non-alignment and neutrality and declines to accept narcotics assistance from the United States. Despite their preference to resolve the problem themselves, Burmese officials have recently been more willing to exchange views on the international drug situation with the United States and international agencies. As long as Burma's internal security is threatened, however, the Burmese Government will undoubtedly continue to devote its resources to the counter- insurgency effort, including continued tolerance of the activities of the KKY.