8
As important as bilateral programs are to the solution of the prob- lems, in the final analysis the suppression of narcotics in Southeast Asia will require regional cooperation. To attack it, therefore, requires coor- dination between narcotics law enforcement officials of all countries in the area.
The United States is attempting to encourage regional cooperation in Southeast Asia through the Regional BNDD Office which is lo- cated in Bangkok. While there has been little success in these efforts and the results are not yet satisfactory, several countries are developing an awareness of the need to coordinate activities and to exchange information.
BNDD agents in Southeast Asia also work closely with U.S. Customs officials stationed in the area.
U.S. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
Briefly stated, the role of the U.S. Bureau of Customs is to prevent the illegal entry of narcotics into the United States.
It is the contention of U.S. Customs that the best place to interdict the flow of narcotics is at the U.S. border. As several Customs officials explained, "the bottleneck in narcotics smuggling is at the U.S. border and this is the best place to attack the problem." This has not proved to be completely effective, however, for in spite of intensified inspection and examination procedures, an unknown quantity of heroin slips by Customs and enters the United States each year. As part of its pro- gram to impede the illegal flow of narcotics the United States has offered Customs assistance to foreign countries (1) to improve in- spection and screening of traffic at lawful points of entry and exit; and (2) to prevent smuggling at border and coastal points and interior air strips.
U.S. Customs agents are stationed in several countries around the world, including Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam. These agents advise and assist local customs officials and in Laos conduct inspections and examinations of aircraft personnel and baggage entering or leav- ing the country. In addition, U.S. Customs agents participate in border patrol operations along the Mekong River in the Golden Triangle. And in March 1972 Customs began recruiting 25 agents with intelligence experience to collect data on smuggling operations abroad. These agents are being assigned to principal opium source countries or at key points along the smuggling routes to the United States. (At the time the Survey Team was in Southeast Asia, Customs intelligence personnel were in Laos and South Vietnam but not in Thailand.)
According to several Customs officials in Southeast Asia and in Washington, the raison d'être for establishing an intelligence collection capability was that "BNDD did not share all of the intelligence that it collected." One particularly outspoken official said, "BNDD is not likely to work on behalf of Customs. As a result it was decided to send our own intelligence agents overseas." Unfortunately, like many BNDD agents overseas, all of those Customs intelligence officials do not speak the language of the country in which they are stationed.
On the other hand, BNDD officials complained that Customs is "not entirely forthcoming with a lot of the information that they get. BNDD does not receive a regular flow of intelligence from Customs."
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