TNAG-0409-FCO40-455-Allegations-of-bribery-and-corruption-in-the-Hong-Kong-polic-1973 — Page 155

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That, in the field of corruption, it is impossible for anyone to come forward and report; that if he is the other party to the transaction he is an accomplice; and if he is being pressurised into making payments, he runs the risk of physical danger for himself and his family and financial disaster for himself.

This is another variation of argument no. 2 above. It is really an argument in support of the view that court action and disciplinary proceedings (both of which involve the giving of evidence) are unsuitable, indeed impossible, methods of dealing with a great many cases of corruption. The argument has no bearing on the question of separation.

The there is great esprit de corps in the Royal Hong Kong Police Force. They call each other "tze ge yan", meaning “one of ourselves". Since the riots in 1967, this strong sense of mutual loyalty has increased; and this inhibits officers from investigating suspected corruption of fellow officers.

I feel certain that the public would not consider it a desirable thing that there should be little or no esprit de corps in the Police Force, or in any other disciplined public service. Of course, we are all familiar with the expression "dog will not eat dog". I have heard it used with reference to professional men, including doctors, lawyers, architects, journalists, army officers, etc. It is some- times a temptation for a person to put "the good name of my profession" or "the good name of the regiment" before professional duty and the truth. But I have never heard it suggested that there should be a separate agency for the investigation of other offences committed by police officers, although I notice from Mr. JONES' report (paragraph 220 above) that the Singapore Com- missioner of Police said that in his experience it is never easy for a police officer to investigate a fellow officer. If, of course, corruption is widespread in the Force, I can easily understand how it might be virtually impossible in many cases for "the pot to call the kettle black". But, otherwise, I do not think that there is a great deal in the "esprit de corps" argument, if it is examined in isolation.

That Mr. Godber's admirable actions in 1967 may have rendered his colleagues less ready to act on the presumption of corruption on his part.

This argument is put forward in support of the esprit de corps argument. GODBER was under investigation for 2 years as a result of information passed to the A.C. Office by the Commissioner himself. The case was reported regularly to the Target Committee; and at one stage, on the direction of the Target Committee, GODBER ceased to be a target the evidence was simply not good enough. Then in late April, the Commissioner himself obtained further information of a more specific nature; and by the end of May, the A.C. Office had obtained enough evidence to justify the issue of the section 10 letter and the search warrant. The rest of the story is told in my first report.

There was not a scrap of evidence to suggest that the A.C. Office failed at any stage to pursue their investigations thoroughly. If, on the other hand, the argument is put forward in support of the view that those "running alongside the bus" were deterred from reporting GODBER's activities out of admiration for his bravery during the 1967 riots, I think it will be obvious from what I have said earlier in this report that there are many more compelling reasons why those "in the bus" and "running alongside the bus" do nothing to assist the A.C. Office.

That an officer of the Anti-Corruption Office cannot be expected to carry out his duties with dispassion and integrity when under the strain of knowing that he will be returned to ordinary service in a year or so, and may well be serving under a senior officer whose corrupt activities he has investigated.

To a great many people, this is a most compelling argument. On the face of it, it should apply as regards any offence-larceny, drunken-driving, etc. But, again, I suppose the argument is that it is very rare for senior officers to be found guilty of larceny, or drunken-driving; but that it would be rare for a junior officer to find himself working under a senior officer who was not corrupt. The argument again presupposes widespread corruption in the Police Force; and it has weight in regard only to the question of the thoroughness with which a junior police officer might be expected to investigate an allegation of corruption against a senior police officer-not to the manner in which the junior police officer might be expected to investigate senior officers in other departments, except in so far as the argument may suggest that no police officer thinks that corruption should be an offence anyway. But taking the argument in isolation and divorced from any suggestion of wide- spread corruption, I should have thought that in a very large police force such as we have in Hong Kong, it would have been a relatively simple matter to arrange departmentally that no junior officer would ever be asked to serve under a senior whose corrupt activities had come under observa- tion by the A.C. Office.

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