TNAG-0409-FCO40-455-Allegations-of-bribery-and-corruption-in-the-Hong-Kong-polic-1973 — Page 133

ho

the

ng,

ide

ce-

nat

ug

eir

ut

to

eir

he

ly

1e

h

le

S.

a

Seven

S

1

$

104. Of course, in some cases what may have been extremely lucrative fields for corruption a few years ago, may not be so today. For example, about the mid-60's, certain amendments were made to the Buildings Ordinance; and it paid land developers to get their plans approved by the Buildings Office before a certain date. It was alleged to the Commission that during a certain period a number of very large corrupt payments were made to certain persons in return for their speeding up approval of certain building plans.

105. I was told that narcotics has always been a tremendously lucrative source of corruption. A police officer or group of police officers or Preventive Service officers may shut their eyes to the importation of a large quantity of heroin. Indeed, one informant said that it was quite possible for a police officer to make more money in one corrupt transaction of this kind than he could earn honestly after 20 years service.

106. I could go on and on in this vein. But perhaps I have said enough to demonstrate that a large section. of the public believe that corruption exists to a greater or lesser extent in many areas of the public service, and that it is rife in certain departments, particularly those which I have named.

107. As I have said, I am not sitting as a judge making findings of fact on specific charges. No person, or group of persons, is on trial. But, for the purpose of deciding whether to recommend that more "teeth" should be put into the Ordinance, whether disciplinary procedure should be relaxed, and so on, I feel that I must assume, for the purpose of this inquiry, that there is a great deal of truth in what the public believe and allege.

108. Judging by statements made in the news media and elsewhere, one gets the impression that the public think that heads of Government departments are either ignorant as to the extent to which corruption exists in the public service or connive at it or even approve of it. It is a great pity that there should be this communica- tion

gap between the Government and the people. The public can rest assured that the heads of certain depart- ments are fully aware of the fact that corruption exists in their departments. I do not wish to draw any invidious distinctions between the reactions of the various heads to whom I have written; but I cannot speak too highly of the reaction of the Commissioner of Police and the Director of Immigration. They are not the "babes in the wood" that some members of the public would have us believe. They, and other heads, are able men who are fully conversant with the opportunities for corruption in their commands, and feel utterly frustrated that they are unable to do more about it.

109. I shall now say a word or two about the sheer difficulty of obtaining evidence in corruption cases.

Why is it so difficult to establish guilt in cases of bribery and corruption?

110. As is well-known, corruption takes many different forms. To start with a simple and, of course, purely hypothetical example: Supposing a land developer wished to have speedy approval of his building plans and that he managed to achieve his object by bribing some official in the Buildings Office to so arrange matters that the particular plans were considered earlier than they would otherwise have been considered in the ordinary course. How could an offence of that sort ever see the light of day? The chances are that if the “advantage” took the form of a money payment, this would not take place before witnesses. It would either be made in secret, or in some very indirect way. The two parties to the corrupt transaction would be satisfied parties. Unless the public official happened to be a specially "planted" agent provocateur he would certainly not complain against the building contractor; and vice versa.

111. It is said that in many cases corrupt payments are made not in respect of any particular transaction, but to create an atmosphere of goodwill which the giver hopes to benefit from in his dealings with the public. officer in the future. The giver, of course, runs a distinct risk as regards his first payment. The recipient may not be a satisfied party. His sense of honesty and public duty may result in the giver being brought to justice. But, it is said, givers are good psychologists. There is always the tentative approach. They have usually summed- up their man before incriminating themselves; and so once again we have two satisfied parties.

112. It is said that payments are frequently made on a kind of conditional basis. Take the case of a certificate of origin issued by the Commerce and Industry Department. Supposing the Department has to be satisfied that all materials used in the manufacture of a particular article which is scheduled for export is of Hong Kong origin; and supposing a corrupt manufacturer uses cloth of Chinese origin because it is cheaper. Sup- posing, a corrupt factory inspector is prepared to turn a blind eye to this in consideration of, say, $500 per month. If one of his superiors in the department happens to carry out an unexpected check and discovers that cloth of Chinese origin has been used, the inspector simply apologises to his superior for his negligence, and returns the $500 in respect of that particular month to the manufacturer saying that he regrets that something has gone wrong. Although the Commerce and Industry Department may have strong suspicions, they could not possibly obtain a conviction on such evidence. The money would be returned secretly; and, again, there would be 2 satisfied parties-the inspector and the manufacturer.

25