TNAG-0402-FCO40-448-Review-of-the-death-sentence-in-Hong-Kong-1973 — Page 56

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unlikely that we should return unreservedly to the

pre-Tsoi position. Everything depends on how the

reservation works out in practice. If conflict is

to be avoided, then before you take any decision to

let the law take its course, you will need to be

absolutely certain of Ministers' views on current

circumstances in the UK and on the case in question,

and that these views will remain unchanged. This

implies a need for even closer liaison between us,

s we can achieve.

which I am sure

I fear there still remains in the background an

obvious possibility of difficulty if in a specific

case you decide that you could not, in the

circumstances of Hong Kong, grant a reprieve, despite

the probability of serious trouble in Parliament.

This could have all the serious consequences described

in paragraph 5 of your telegram number 788. But at

this stage we can do no more than note the

importance of avoiding this situation; and I take it

that the argument that the worst, thing for Hong Kong

might

would be a row in Parliament, would not be wholly

ineffective in Executive Council if it was used

early enough.

I imagine that you will want to show my other

letter to some of your senior advisers, including

members of Executive Council. This is why I have

split my comments in two. But this does bring up

the question of what, if anything, we should say in

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