TNAG-0384-FCO40-430-Trade-relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-the-EEC-1973 — Page 96

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

a

dr the

all- beck position, for lexclusion of their principal compresifons

in these commockties,

there is an over-riding political objection to this

course because it would involve seeking amendment

of the terms on which we acceded to the Communities.

Their estimate, which is shared by our Permanent

Representation in Brussels is that we would not get

the amendment. So while trying to get it (and

failing) would temporarily ease our relations with

the Hong Kong Government, it would not help Hong Kong

in practice. At the same time it would put HMG in

very considerable difficulties, both domestically

and internationally. Domestically because the

Opposition would be quick to say that if the terms

of our Accession could be varied for Hong Kong they

could be varied for the United Kingdom.

Internation-

ally because other Commonwealth countries would take

the same line. We avoided difficulty with India,

Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in Ottawa only by holding

firmly to the line (on the Secretary of State's

instructions) that on 1 January 1974 we had no

alternative but to begin to raise our tariffs against

them according to the terms of our accession. It

might also open the door to pressure from our

Community partners to change aspects of the treaty

13/ OPTION 2

Failing her inclusion in

which they did not like.

Failing

the GSP for textiles and footwear, Hong Kong wants

us to work for the complete exclusion of these two

commodities from the GSPA While we could accept the

former bert

atter Lif

If it were to be the outcome of negotiations on

the wider issues (see below) both FCO and DTI

officials see overriding objections to our making a

they

direct proposals of this nature because/it would be

T

7.

CONFIDENTIAL

/contrary

(17259) Dd.897459 250m 12/72 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863 (16941) Dd.897300 250m 9/72 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863