TNAG-0378-FCO40-424-UK-policy-on-the-future-of-Hong-Kong-after-1997-1973 — Page 79

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confidence and

7. Moreover since/the viability of Hong Kong depend to an

fpartly on what people think is the policy of China,

Therefore,

If the Chinese Government again became overtly hostile

before 1997, we could be forced by a decline in

al a NA

impovian

exteri

public confidence to approach them when there would

be little chance of an agreement. We should therefore

not rule out the possibility of opening talks with

the Chinese at a comparatively early date if a road we enance emerges of] an agreement or understanding which

would give us greater security of tenure both up to

1997 and beyond]

51

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8.

If we approached the Chinese Government now,

we might in the present climate be able to agree on

an orderly withdrawal in 1997, but not on our

retention of the Colony beyond that date. There is

a risk that, by waiting for a more favourable

opportunity, we might lose the chance of any agreement

But an agreement now to withdraw in 1997 could itself

be destabilising if it became public knowledge, and

could therefore defeat its own purpose. A chance of

a more favourable agreement might come either before

or after the death of the present leaders. The

balance of advantage is still to wait.

9. I therefore conclude that the recommendations

of DOP(71)83 are still valid, but that we should

continue to keep them under annual review. I invite

my colleagues to concur.

-S୧

ofer

enjoy

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