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leaders are replaced (which must happen before very long).
Their successors, moreover, would be more likely to honour
a more explicit agreement than the oral undertaking on which
we now rely. Assessments Staff are inclined to think that we
should take this present chance rather than submit to the
uncertain future.
5.
But we cannot yet be sure whether the objective of an
agreement or understanding for us to stay beyond 1997 may not
be attainable in the future. Moreover, any discussions with
the Chinese would be likely to become public knowledge, and
an agreement for an orderly withdrawal would be worse than
valueless if it damaged present public confidence in Hong Kong.
There is a risk of this which would of course be increased if
the discussions were unsuccessful. The case for negotiations
for a withdrawal only becomes really strong when nervousness
about a possible disorderly or earlier takeover has become
more real than the fear of the deadline. But this is not yet
the case. Although therefore there are risks in inaction,
the balance of advantage is still to wait.
6. These considerations do, however, underline the importance
of timing and the continuing need for an annual review. I
submit a draft DOPC paper accordingly. Far Eastern Department
and Planning Staff agree, and the paper's conclusions have been
agreed with the Assessments Staff.
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17.
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