TNAG-0378-FCO40-424-UK-policy-on-the-future-of-Hong-Kong-after-1997-1973 — Page 63

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7.

Moreover confidence and the viability of Hong

Kong depend to an important extent on what people

think is the policy of China. If, therefore, the

Chinese Government again became overtly hostile

before 1997, we could be forced by a decline in

public confidence to approach them at a time when

there would be little chance of an agreement. We

should therefore not rule out the possibility of

opening talks with the Chinese at a comparatively

although only,

early date if we see a real chance of concluding an early date if

agreement or understanding which would give us

greater security of tenure.

Xx

8. If we approached the Chinese Government now, I judge Kat

we might in the present climate be able to agree on

an orderly withdrawal in 1997, but not on our

retention of the Colony beyond that date. There is

a risk that, by waiting for a more favourable oppor-.

tunity, we might lose the chance of any agreement.

But an agreement now to withdraw in 1997 could itself damage confidence

be destabilising if it became public knowledge, and

could therefore defeat its own purpose. A chance of

a more favourable agreement might come either before

or after the death of the present leaders. The

balance of advantage is still to wait.

9. I therefore conclude that the recommendations

of DOP(71)83 are still valid, but that we should

continue to keep them under annual review.

my colleagues to concur,

Ftvite

by

26 Jammer, to the contrary "I will

CS (

Jannery that

colleagues agree.

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