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could give such an undertaking.
2. Sir Murray MacLehose commented that of all
fields, this was one where consistency was
essential. It would be morally wrong and politi-
cally dangerous for the Government to give the
appearance of changing its mind for frivolous
reasons.
3. Mr Royle said the danger was that there might
be a row and the Government would have to change
its mind. Sir Alec Douglas-Home replied that if
such a row seemed likely, he would take, the matter
on the next or indeed in earl occasion. back to the DOPC, though he did not want to. Even
abolitionist Ministers had supported the line
which he had outlined.
Vo mailan the dealt
penally
In his view a decis im had been taken. and should be adhered to
4. Sir Denis Greenhill said that the row, if any,
would be likely to arise post facto.
We had agreed
a
ww
a procedure whereby the Governor would give the
advancs
Foreign Office notice of his probable decision, so
that if Ministers decided not to support him they
adopt the alternative couse of changie
could change the law before his decision was made
public. This seemed reasonable; but the trigger
commented
for a campaign against an execution would come
publicly later, when the Governor/confirmed a death sentence
5. Mr Royle replied that if Ministers decided
at the preliminary stage to support the Governor,
then they would have to stick to this, unless new
facts came to light, for example in the prisoner's
Petition to The Queen, suggesting that there might
have been a miscarriage of justice. Ministers
would thus, if they took this decision, reaffirm
the policy followed before the recent case of Tsoi.
There was
1
the diffrently was that if
pubbli row about the foremments decision to support the fovernor would be likely to arise foot tadlo.
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/6.
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