TNAG-0365-FCO40-411-Relations-between-Hong-Kong-and-international-organisations-1973 — Page 93

CONFIDENTIAL

CHINA AND HONG KONG

31. In view of the formal protests which China has already made in the UPU and the ITU about the description of Hong Kong in the publications of those two bodies as a UK Dependent Territory, and not as an integral part of China, she will probably raise objections to the separate representation of Hong Kong in ECAFE. We do not yet know what form these objections will take. At the UPU and ITU meetings last autumn the Chinese protest was clearly intended simply for the record. (As it is British policy to avoid as far as possible political discussion in those essentially technical bodies we made no response to the Chinese protest). The Chinese will similarly be exercised by the presence of South Korea and South Vietnam at the ECAFE Meeting, and there are indications that they may be content in those cases with making a formal protest at the beginning of the session, (which would be rebutted equally formally), and would then proceed with the business of the meeting without further fuss.

If

32. None of these examples is necessarily a good guide to Chinese conduct on the representation of Hong Kong in ECAFE. the Chinese delegate confines himself to making a statement for the record about the status of Hong Kong, the UK delegate should do no more than issue a quiet counter-statement. As present Chinese policy is to leave matters as they are over Hong Kong, it is possible that they will do no more than this.

33. If China pursues the issue, and objects fundamentally to Hong Kong's separate representation in ECAFE there are two possible fallback positions: the first is to argue that only ECOSOC has the power to alter the present position (but we cannot be sure that ECOSOC itself would support Hong Kong); or to subsume Hong Kong's representation in that of the United Kingdom in line with her representation in other UN bodies (but this has practical disadvantages and would be a humiliating retreat for Hong Kong).

3.4. Our first objective must be to ensure that Hong Kong's voice continues to be heard in ECAFE. We must also maintain as low a profile as possible.

35.

The delegation should report by immediate telegram any moves which the Chinese make on the question of Hong Kong's presence. If the Chinese take up a position more extreme than a simple protest for the record, the United Kingdom delegation should, in consultation with the Hong Kong representative, formally reserve our position and seek immediate instructions.

¥

36.

If the Chinese simply protest for the record the United Kingdom delegate should circulate a formal rebuttal on the following lines:

37.

"with reference to the statement made by the Chinese

representative, the United Kingdom representative wishes to inform the meeting that his Government's views on this question were clearly stated in the letter addressed by Her Majesty's Representative in New York to the

Secretary-General of the United Nations on 19 December 1972".

The UK Delegation should if at all possible confine their response to the circulation of a written document, but may in the last resort speak on these lines in Plenary.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CANADA