TNAG-0347-FCO40-383-Dormant-Commission-for-Commander-of-British-Forces-in-Hong-K-1972 — Page 41

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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7. In the years since 1950 the size of the Garrison has been

reduced and the Chinese military potential has substantially

increased. The present situation is that not only would it be

impossible effectively to defend Hong Kong against a determined

Chinese attack; it would be extremely unlikely that resistance

to such an attack could be prolonged for a period sufficient

to mount anything more than a last minute crash operation to

evacuate a small number of people including the more sensitive

personnel.

8.

This gradual change in the situation has been reflected

in a series of modifications over the years in the role of the

garrison as set out in successive Military Directives; and

the current Directive, in describing the task of the Garrison

in relation to external aggression, prescribes the role of the

Garrison as follows:-

"to be prepared, in the event of Chinese armed aggression,

to identify such aggression and to offer such resistance

as may be appropriate in the circumstances then prevailing,

in accordance with political direction at the time."

It is clear from the above that the role of the Hong Kong

Garrison has undergone a fundamental change since the Dormant

Commission was issued twenty years ago; and there is no longer

any question of fighting a "last ditch" rearguard action in

support of a general evacuation plan.

9.

Since 1962 successive Governors of Hong Kong have supported

the view that in the changed circumstances it would be the

Governor's duty, in the event of determined Chinese aggression

against the Colony, to remain at his post, as he did in 1941,

and secure the best treatment possible for the people of Hong

Kong in an orderly handover.

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