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7. In the years since 1950 the size of the Garrison has been
reduced and the Chinese military potential has substantially
increased. The present situation is that not only would it be
impossible effectively to defend Hong Kong against a determined
Chinese attack; it would be extremely unlikely that resistance
to such an attack could be prolonged for a period sufficient
to mount anything more than a last minute crash operation to
evacuate a small number of people including the more sensitive
personnel.
8.
This gradual change in the situation has been reflected
in a series of modifications over the years in the role of the
garrison as set out in successive Military Directives; and
the current Directive, in describing the task of the Garrison
in relation to external aggression, prescribes the role of the
Garrison as follows:-
"to be prepared, in the event of Chinese armed aggression,
to identify such aggression and to offer such resistance
as may be appropriate in the circumstances then prevailing,
in accordance with political direction at the time."
It is clear from the above that the role of the Hong Kong
Garrison has undergone a fundamental change since the Dormant
Commission was issued twenty years ago; and there is no longer
any question of fighting a "last ditch" rearguard action in
support of a general evacuation plan.
9.
Since 1962 successive Governors of Hong Kong have supported
the view that in the changed circumstances it would be the
Governor's duty, in the event of determined Chinese aggression
against the Colony, to remain at his post, as he did in 1941,
and secure the best treatment possible for the people of Hong
Kong in an orderly handover.
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