t
1
10. We have discussed these aspects with Mr Royle (who has in
turn spoken to the Minister of State) and his view is that there
are no European grounds for moving to quotas and tariffs any earlier than we are required to do by our entry into the EEC. Moreover there has been no pressure from the Community to take
the action now proposed by the DTI.
11.
EPC(71)97 glosses over the various undertakings given by British Ministers and officials particularly to the developing
countries of the Commonwealth and minimises the reactions of
these countries. In the difficult negotiations on our change
from quotas to tariffs, we argued that we were working towards
liberalisation and that tariffs would enable reasonably efficient
developing countries to maintain, if not increase, their trade.
To retreat from this position, without clear proof that market
disruption was being caused by imports (which on the evidence produced by the DTI is not the case), would be a denial of the
frequent affirmations of the tariff policy which we have made to all countries subject to the existing import régime; the most
specific of these affirmations have been to India and Hong Kong.
INDIA AND HONG KONG
12.
The main statements to the Indians (the most recent of which
was one by the Secretary of State at his meeting with Mrs Ghandi on 1 November) are at B and to the Hong Kong Government at C.
The key assurance to the Hong Kong Government was that made by
Mr Rippon, who said in September 1970 that "he foresaw no danger
of Hong Kong having to face both tariffs and quotas before
British entry into the EEC".
78/2/√19 VT
CONFIDENTIAL
/13.
**
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