TNAG-0300-FCO40-336-Entitlement-of-Hong-Kong-to-generalized-tariffs-preferences--1971 — Page 49

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

CONFIDENTIAL

could if need be use a lax interpretation of tho condition that total imports must rise to allow us to act in particular sectors.

Abandon the Crosland formula and use during 1972 our rights under the GATT Long Term Cotton Arrangement (LTA) í e to act against disruption in particular producta regardless of how total importa

were behaving. This would be a breach of faith

with the Commonwealth. Under both a. and b. 1t

might not be easy to act until after some disruption had happened.

Maintain our present quotas in 1972. This would hold down potentially sizable suppliers like Taiwan and Korea, but would mean a row with at least some Commonwealth countries like Pakistan and some very difficult and hurried negotiations to extend our bilateral agreements with India and llong Kong.

Try to anticipate the pattern of the EEC limits and to negotiate (with six or more low-cost suppliers separately) restraints in 1972. This would mean taking upon ourselves the odium of restraints which in 1973 would be borne directly by the European

Commission.

Under none of the foregoing could we expect to achieve any cut-back on existing import levels. In order to cut back (which could only be done at the cost of a really major row with India, Pakistan and llong Kong) we would have to withdraw from tho GATT LTA (and denounce our present quota arrangements if we wanted to act this year), and then invoke Article 19 (covering emergency action) of the GATT. This would leave us technically free to take what over

10

Comments

Approved members can add comments, bookmarks, and private notes.

No comments yet.

Private Research Note

Private notes are available after approval.