TNAG-0300-FCO40-336-Entitlement-of-Hong-Kong-to-generalized-tariffs-preferences--1971 — Page 206

- 4.-

The purpose of this concept (see footnote) was to enable the

United States to exclude Cuba and other Communist states, and

indeed to enable us and the other donors to exclude any country

for political but not trade reasons, but to make sure that all other

developing countries, however competitive, would be beneficiaries

of the schemes of all

11 the donors. It was envisaged that the only

ways in which the problems of any over-competitive goods could be

net would be by way of exceptions or safeguards. If this principle,

which had been generally endorsed by OECD ministers in 1967, wero

put into practice by all, we would have achieved our objective

under (ii), although the USA has always made clear her objection

to the maintainance of reverse preferences.

୨ For some time it has been clear that most of the other donors

have not been prepared to adhere to the self-election principle.

Only New Zealand has wholeheartedly supported us, although the

Nordic Group and Canada have been sympathetic. We have therefore

had to make clear in the OCD that while we still think self-

election would be the best solution, we cannot be expected to have

a significantly longer list of boneficiaries than other major donors.

It would clearly be inequitable, both to domestic industry and

to industries in Commonwealth developing countries having to share

their preferences in our market, if we were to include significant

producers of manufactures and other goods in cur scheme that would

not benefit from the other schemes. But we are not necessarily

bound to adopt precisely the same lists as other donors if we do not

want to.