TNAG-0299-FCO40-335-Entitlement-of-Hong-Kong-to-generalized-tariffs-preferences--1971 — Page 80

official level on 28 May. This decision goes com-

pletely contrary to the message from the Prime Minister

delivered to Mr Sato on 27 May, and of which some of

the participants must have been aware. The Foreign

Ministry have told us that it is unlikely that we shall

get a formal reply to the PM's message before the

officials! recommendation comes before

Cabinet on 20 June. The talks with Mr

fore the last effective opportunity to

the Japanese and his officials Aichi faře there-

apply pressure

further

to the Japanese to extend a worthwhile GPS offer to

Hong Kong ab initio. HM Ambassador at Tokyo urges tha

we perist in this attempt.

bro

desivable to bring home to

if the Seem

ary

It would therefore be helpf the Japanese side State Wove to express forcibly to 2 Aichi HMG's sur-

were

prise and concern that Japan, whose GPS is in any case

less generous in scope than that of the other major

donors, should, notwithstanding the PM's message and

Mr Sato's statement in the Diet, apparently still find

it too difficult to contemplate the inclusion from the

Hong Kay and ther U.K.

outset of Gemmenworth dependent territories as bene-

ficiaries. Among these, only Hong Kong has any siyniz

[Additional arguments for use in the official talks as appropriate Fient industrial experts, A deliberate discrimina- vion against Hong Kong would be especially regrettable

because:-

a. Japan exports four times more goods to Hong

Kong than she imports from Hong Kong.

b. The Japanese example is bound to influence the

decision of other donors, notably the Americans",

against Hong Kong. Inevitably it will appear

that Japan's action has been motivated by a

desire to injure a competitor in the US market.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

in si 152 Japan pint

i just fication of the decisa. I