CONFIDENTIAL
3. I TOLD HARADA THAT EVEN IF WE WERE INCLUDED WE DID
NOT EXPECT A VAST EXPANSION OF OUR EXPORTS TO JAPAN BUT WE
DID NOT WANT THE AMERICANS TO HAVE THIS EXCUSE TO EXCLUDE
US FROM THEIR SCHEME, WE WERE OF COURSE MOST CONCERNED
ABOUT AMERICA BECAUSE OVER 43% OF OUR EXPORTS WENT THERE.
THEREFORE SO LONG AS THE ADMINISTRATION, HAD MADE NO
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PREFERENCES SCHEME THEY WOULD PRESENT TO CONGRESS
(MR KENNEDY MADE THE USUAL GENERAL STATEMENT IN ECAFE
YESTERDAY, BOTH HE AND MIYAZAWA AVOIDED DATES) AND SO
LONG AS THE NIXON MILLS ANTAGONISM ON TEXTILES WAS UNRESOLVED,
WE WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE ACTION THAT MIGHT ANTAGONISE THE
ADMINISTRATION (THOUGH THIS WAS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT
THAT CONGRESS WILL HAVE THE LAST WORD ON PREFERENCES
TOO).
HARADA WAS CONCERNED THAT THE JAPANESE POSITION SHOULD
GET SOME SUPPORT BEFORE 1 JULY: OTHERWISE MILLS WOULD
FIND IT DIFFICULT TO RESIST A QUOTA BILL. THE JAPANESE
HAD NOT APPROACHED TAIWAN OR KOREA YET. HE SEEMED TO
FEEL THAT THEY HAD ANNOYED THE US ADMINISTRAION ENOUGH ALREADY.
THEY HOPED THAT KENNEDY WOULD TAKE INITIATIVE, THOUGH
DID NOT EXPECT IT TO BE VERY SPECIFIC. I TOO HOPED THAT
KENNEDY WOULD DO THIS, AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE
VERY HELPFUL IF THE JAPANESE COULD LET THE EMBASSY KNOW HOW
THEIR TALKS WENT BEFORE KENNEDY REACHED HONG KONG. HARADA
SAID THAT THE PERSONALLY AGREED. HE MENTIONED WAKEFIELD'S
NAME, THIS TOO MIGHT BE WORTH FOLLOWING UP.
5. HARADA CONFIRMED THAT THE "SURVEILLANCE."
IN THE JAPANESE SCHEMES MEANS CONTROL BY CATEGORIES,
WHERE. THIS SEEMS NECESSARY TO THE JAPANESE (COVERNMENT, NOT INDUSTRY
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2 CONFIDENTIAL
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