TNAG-0295-FCO40-331-Long-term-study-of-the-future-of-Hong-Kong-1971 — Page 30

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doing so we should have to resist any Chinese pressure to permit us

to stay only in Macao-like conditions. Unless assured of indefinite

tenure under 4(c)(ii) or unless we got a solution on the lines of

4(c)(iii) we should have always to bear in mind that, at an

appropriate and favourable moment from our point of view, we should

have tonegotiate with the Chinese Government about the future of the

Colony.

We must recognise that the Chinese Government retain the

ability at any time to expel us and there would be little which we

could do to resist. If it is apparent that the Chinese Government

will never envisage a solution which leaves us in control of Hong

Kong after 1997, then we should have to go for a solution on the

lines of 4(c)(i).

Alternative 12.

Our first objective should be to try for a solution on the lines B

of 4(c)(i). Only if a handover under tolerable conditions in 1997

or earlier seems impossible, should we try to remain in Hong Kong

after 1997. In that case we should resist as far as possible

Chinese pressure to impose a Macao-style solution on us and hold out

for a favourable moment at which we can negotiate with the Chinese

Government a reasonable settlement. We must recognise that if the

Chinese Government is determined to expel us any time, there is

little we can do to prevent this.

13. No immediate action is necessary on the recommendations in this

paper except that officials should be instructed to review the

situation annually, reporting to the Secretary of State.

approach to the Chinese Government would need to be very carefully

timed and in a form which could, if necessary be disavowed.

Any

/Ideally

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